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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the mechanisms through which increasing market competition may help 
cooperatives to improve technical efficiency to guarantee positive profits. This hypothesis is 
first formalised in a partial equilibrium framework and then is tested on a sample of European 
investor owned and cooperative firms, belonging to the dairy industry, using frontier analysis. 
Technical efficiency indexes are computed by using the one-stage approach as suggested by 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), where proxies for competition are introduced as 
determinants of efficiency variancey. The results support the hypothesis that increasing market 
competition can affect positively the cooperatives´ efficiency.  
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 1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the relationships between market competition and efficiency for the 
European food industry. Due to the increasing competition in the product market and the 
reduced support from EU, European agricultural co-operatives have gone through a 
substantial restructuring process involving vertical integration and changes in ownership 
structure (van Bekkum and van Dijk Gert, 1998). This paper tests whether European 
cooperatives are experiencing an improvement in technical efficiency following these 
structural changes in the economic environment.  
The work first formalises, in a partial equilibrium framework, the relationship between 
product market competition, profit sharing and technical efficiency. In the case of a 
cooperative, competition could give its workers the incentives to improve efficiency so 
to guarantee the firm survival for the following reasons. Consider a firm where workers 
have control rights over a specific asset, their effort, and are paid by a fixed fraction of 
the overall surplus. The firm organizes the production using both a fixed asset and the 
worker’s effort as inputs; in order to produce, the firm needs the worker’s effort that is, 
without the workers’ effort, production cannot start. Because of the lag between the 
time the firm starts the production and the time the workers decide on effort, a standard 
hold-up problem arises. Workers may prefer to invest in the effort so to maximize their 
own expected pay-off from the relationship with the firm, instead of the overall surplus. 
Therefore, the supplied effort is sub-optimal from the firm’s standpoint and so she will 
appear inefficient, as the actual output will be lower than the potential output. The 
degree of product market competition, faced by the cooperative in the market, can 
increase for several factors like economic policy and different consumers tastes. From 
the workers’ standpoint, this implies that their profit sharing bonus decreases as well 
and therefore they may want to readjust their effort so to counterbalance the effect of 
the negative shock on the profit-sharing bonus. These re-adjustments have an impact on 
the firm’s technical efficiency. As workers increase their investment, the actual output 
increases and gets closer to the potential output; therefore, inefficiency for the firm 
reduces.  
This theoretical hypothesis is tested empirically for a panel of investor-owned and 
cooperative European firms, specialized in the dairy production, over the time 1996-
2003. The dataset includes both investor owned and cooperative firms sourced from 
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 AMADEUS, a database that contains standardised annual accounts (for up to 10 years), 
financial ratios, activities and ownership for approximately 8 million companies 
throughout Europe. Technical efficiency indexes are computed by using the one-stage 
approach as suggested by Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), where proxies of the 
state of competition in the market are introduced as determinants of efficiency. The 
structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents a model of the theoretical 
relationship between competition, technical efficiency change and profit sharing. The 
empirical model, the data and the results are presented in Section 3, 4 and 5. Finally 
some concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.   
 
 
2. The general framework 
Consider an industry with i=1,..,N firms. There are i=1,..,N identical workers and 
worker i works in firm i. The allocation of each worker to each firm is pre-determined 
and the worker cannot leave the firm. Each firm produces a differentiated good and 
faces a downward-sloping demand curve. Each period the firm uses the following 
production technology, where the worker’s effort appears as an input:  
 
α
1,, −= titi ey                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
with 1<α . The worker in the firm provides a firm-specific input (e) which we can 
think of as related to the effort of learning new techniques which are specific to the firm 
and that therefore outside the firm they are of no use. We assume that in every time 
period new techniques are to be learnt by the worker. However, the decision on how 
much effort to invest in period t is made in period t-1 where the planning is done.  
Output is being sold at the price:  
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where yi,t is the supply of the good i, y  is an index of the overall market demand, 
assumed for simplicity to be equal to 1 and 10 << θ . We interpret θ as an indicator of 
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 product market competition, where a large value is an indication that product market 
competition is intense.  
The worker decides each period on how much effort to devote for the next period. Once 
the decision has been made, it cannot be undone immediately. We assume that the 
worker in firm i is rewarded by a share si of the profit pi,tyi,. The per period utility 
function of the worker is defined as: 
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with ci,t being the consumption of the worker employed in the firm i at time t. His 
budget constraint is ci,t=sipi,tyi,. Lifetime utility is then: 
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where δ is the discount factor and e-1=0. 
To simplify the analysis, we shall consider a three period version of the model with 
period t = 0, 1, 2. The time line of the model is as follows. At time 0, the firm is set up 
and the worker of the firm is hired. At time 1, the worker decides on e. At time 2, the 
fixed asset is hired and so production can take place. Output is then sold and the surplus 
shared between the worker and the firm’s owners. The worker consumes at the end of 
the period. Because of the lag between the moment the firm organizes the production 
and the time the worker decides on effort, it is impossible to write complete contracts 
and therefore a standard hold-up problem (Hart, 1995) arises: indeed the worker 
maximizes his own expected pay-off from the relationship with the firm, instead of the 
overall surplus (that is, both the worker’s and firm’s surplus). Therefore, the effort is 
optimal from the worker’s standpoint, but not for the firm. For this reason, the firm’s 
actual output will differ from the output it could potentially produce if there was no 
hold-up problem and so the firm will appear technically inefficient. Notice that in the 
whole process the two parties have symmetric information and there is no uncertainty 
about the parties’ costs and utility functions. We analyze the model by backwards 
induction and assume perfect foresight. Finally, we derive the measure of technical 
efficiency and measure how it varies when there is an increase in product market 
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 competition. In period 2, the worker is not going to invest any effort as there is no future 
and production takes place: 
 
α
1,2, ii ey =                                                                     (5) 
 
and the worker’s profit-sharing bonus (that is consumed by the worker) is sipi,2   yi,2. In 
period 1, the worker’s effort choice is: 
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A sufficient condition for (7) to be a maximum is . In period 0, the worker 
faces a similar problem and he chooses similarly. Effort is increasing in the degree of 
competition (θ).  
12 −< αθ
 
Proposition 1. An unexpected increase in product market competition induces an 
increase of the worker’s effort. 
 
Proof. Compute the derivative of the effort with respect to θ: 
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This derivative is positive if .  Q.E.D. 12 −< αθ
The interpretation is straightforward. The worker makes his effort decision based on her 
expectations about future revenues. If she anticipates that competition gets stiffer and 
therefore its expected profit sharing bonus will decrease, she decides to spend more 
effort so to increase the firm’s output and this way its profit sharing bonus.  
The industry is populated with firms with different input characteristics and therefore 
technical efficiency would be higher in some firms rather than in others. We can 
measure technical efficiency in firm i in period t as the ratio between the actual level of 
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 output produced at time t by the firm i ( ), and the potential industry output, which 
could be produced at time t ( ) (Farrell, 1957).  
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Our main interest is to find out how technical efficiency in periods 1 and 2 in firm i is 
affected by a permanent, but unexpected change in the product market competition in 
period 1. The fact that it is unexpected implies that it could not be taken into account 
when effort was decided in period 0. The fact that it is permanent implies that worker 
will wish to adjust the effort choice made in period 1, once he has observed the change 
in period 1. Many different factors, some related to specific policies and some to 
consumers´ taste affect the intensity of competition in the product market. Among the 
policy related factors we find tariffs and other artificially created barriers to entry that 
reduce competition, as well as policies that advance competition by introducing product 
standardization. Among the taste related factors, we notice that firms can avoid 
competition by exploiting the fact that consumers typically have a preference for variety 
and for particular brands. It is also important to note that the change to product market 
competition is specific to firm i, that is, the shock is firm specific. Therefore, we can 
take the industry potential output as given. 
Consider first what happens to technical efficiency in period 1. Since the effort has 
already been decided in period 0 based on expected competition, we get: 
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Next, consider period 2. After the change has been observed in period 1, it is 
incorporated in the expectations and the worker adjusts her effort choice to 
accommodate the new environment in period 2. The change in technical efficiency is 
period 2 is therefore given by: 
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Therefore we can conclude that when product market competition increases, technical 
efficiency increases as well. The intuition behind this result is quite simple. An increase 
in competition implies for the worker that their profit sharing bonus decreases and 
therefore they may want to readjust their effort so to counterbalance the negative effect 
of competition. However, the decision of increasing effort will only have an impact on 
the next period’s profit sharing bonus because of the time lag between the workers’ 
decision on effort and production. These re-adjustments have an impact on the firm’s 
technical efficiency. As workers increase their effort in the first period, the actual output 
in period 2 increases and gets closer to the potential output. The result is that 
inefficiency in period 2 for the firm reduces. 
 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
The key prediction from the model is that cooperatives´ technical efficiency can 
increase as competition increases. To test this theoretical prediction, we use the so-
called frontier approach to the measurement of technical efficiency where technical 
efficiency scores are computed as the distance from an estimated stochastic parametric 
production frontier. This approach is motivated by the idea that deviations from the 
production frontier might not be entirely under the control of the firm being studied and 
might be due to measurement errors and other noise upon the frontier. The previous 
specification was usually based on cross-sectional data but recently the collection of 
longitudinal data on firms has encouraged the development of stochastic frontier models 
suitable for panel data. Besides, the analysis of the determinants of efficiency 
differentials was initially performed by the adoption of a two-stage approach: after 
estimating inefficiency by a stochastic frontier technique, inefficiency scores were 
regressed on the exogenous explanatory variables usually by OLS; however, the two-
stage estimation procedure is inconsistent with the assumption of identically distributed 
inefficiency effects of the first stage. Recently, the one-stage approach has been 
proposed where the effects on inefficiency  of exogenous variables are estimated 
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 simultaneously with the other parameters of the stochastic production frontier model. In 
this paper we follow this approach and let inefficiency to depend on exogenous factors 
by parameterising the variance of inefficiency by adopting the additive formulation for 
the variance of the pre-truncated distribution suggested by Reifschneider and Stevenson 
(1991). Compared to the more standard methodology, pionereed by Kumbhakar, Ghosh 
and McGuckin (1991), where it is the mean of the pretruncated distribution to be 
modelled, this approach has the advantage to address the problem of heteroskedasticity 
in the inefficiency component of the composite error term (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000) .More in detail, Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) propose a model where the 
variance of the inefficiency effects (σuit) is expressed as an explicit function of a vector 
of firm-specific variables. The advantage of this approach is that it allows to compute 
efficiency scores while controlling for the factors which influence the distribution of 
scores across different observations. The technology and the inefficiency model 
parameters are estimated by Maximum likelihood method.  
The model specification is the following: 
 
ln(VAit) = β0 + β1ln(Kit) + β2 (LAbit) + β3 ln(, QKit)2 + β4 ln (LABit)2 +β5 ln(QKit) 
ln(LABit) + β6 ln(QKit)*YEAR + β7 ln(LABit)*YEAR +β8 ln(QKit)*COOP + β9 
ln(LABit)*COOP + β10  YEAR + (vit - uit),                  
vit = γ0 + γ1 SHAREHOLD + γ2 DEP +γ3 SUBS 
uit = δ0 + δ1 COOP+  δ2 Theta-1 +δ3 Theta-1*COOP +δ4 C4 +δ3 C4*COOP                  (12) 
 
where VAit is the value added of the i-th firm at the t-th time period, QKit and LABit are 
input quantities of the i-th firm at the t-th time period and β is a vector of unknown 
parameters. COOP is the dummy variable for the cooperatives, while YEAR is the time 
trend. The vit are random variables which are assumed to be independently distributed 
as a symmetric N(0, σv2) distribution, independent of the uit, with σvit2 = exp( wit γ) 
where wit is a vector of variables which may cause heteroscedasticity. The uit are non-
negative random variables assumed to account for technical inefficiency in production 
and to be independently distributed as a N+(0, σuit2) distribution with σuit2 = exp( zitδ), 
where zit is a p×1 vector of variables which may influence the efficiency of a firm and δ 
is an 1×p vector of parameters to be estimated. 
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 Among the variables used to control for heteroscedasticity, we include those related to 
firm ownership structure and size: SHAREHOLD, DEP and SUBS, which are defined in 
following section. Among the z variables, we introduce competition, the parameter θ  in 
our model (THETA-1), and an alternative measure, the concentration ratio (C4) of the 
four top firms at a national level and the interaction of both variables with the dummy 
COOP. 
 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data set we used is a balanced panel of European investor owned and cooperative 
firms from 1996 to 2003, belonging to the sector of operation of diaries and cheese 
making4 (corresponding to the code DA1551 of the NACE1.1 classification). The 
balanced panel has been extracted from AMADEUS5, a database collecting the annual 
balance sheets of European companies. In addition to the information contained in the 
annual reports, the database reports information on companies’ legal status and form and 
financial data. Firms has been defined as cooperative when so identified in the data set or, 
if not classified, when: the term cooperative or its translation6 was included in the 
company name; the firm was mentioned in the COGECA (2005) report or, for Italy, if the 
company legal form was classified as S.C.A.R.L. According to the legal status, only 
active companies were included and companies classified as in default of payments, in 
bankrupty, inactive, dissolved, in liquidation were excluded as well those with a negative 
current value added. The balanced panel data, which has been extracted, includes 512 
firms; then, the total number of observations, over the seven years, is 3584. According to 
their legal form, 173 firms (corresponding to 1211 observations over the whole time 
period) are cooperatives, while 339 firms (corresponding to 2373 observations) are 
investor owned firms.  
The dairy industry has been selected because it is well-spread in Europe; in addition, the 
number of cooperatives has always been substantial in this sector and this implies that 
their market share has always been quite comparable to that of the investor owned firms 
                                                 
4 This sector excludes the manufacture of ice creams. For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this 
sector interchangeably as the dairy sector or dairy industry.  
5 More information on this database can be found at https://amadeus.bvdep.com. 
6Information on the several legal forms over all the world can be found at 
http://www.gefeg.com/public/grefis-rf/1c1.htm  
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 (van Bekkum and van Dijk, 1998; COGECA, 2005). Finally, firms operating in the dairy 
sector require workers to have some firm-specific skills, consistently with what is 
described in the theoretical model. In our production set, output is measured by the 
company’s value added. Valued added has been obtained by subtracting from operating 
revenue (voice 25 in the AMADEUS database), deflated by the national production index 
(EUROSTAT7), intermediate consumption, which is the sum of material costs, costs of 
goods sold and other operating expenses (the voices 27, 29 and 42 in the AMADEUS 
database), deflated by the national price index of milk. The price index of intermediate 
consumption has been used in alternative but the former has been preferred on the basis 
of its higher and negative correlation with the voice of intermediate consumption after 
deflation. Among the inputs, we include the capital and the labor; the former is given by 
the tangible fixed assets which has been deflated by the national price index of 
investment goods for the industry (EUROSTAT). Both output and capital variables are 
expressed in thousand Euros 2000. Labor is the number of employees (voice 24 in the 
AMADEUS database). In the production set, we have also controlled for additional 
sources of heterogeneity in the firms’ technology. We control for the firm’s location by 
using a dummy variable related to the location of the firm, taking the value of 1 if the 
firm is located in the North countries (Belgium, Finland and Netherlands) and 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable for the cooperatives, COOP, takes the value of 1 if the 
firm is a coop and 0 otherwise. 
Among the variables used to control for heteroscedasticity, we include: SHAREHOLD, 
which is the number of recorded shareholders; DEP, a dummy variable, taking the value 
one if more than the 49.9% of direct or total ownership belongs to one shareholder, 0 
otherwise, and SUBS, which is the number of recorded subsidiaries. Competition, 
THETA-1, is measured by the inverse of the lagged value of the individual firm’s market 
share; the market share is measured by the ratio of firm sales respect to the sales of the 
entire sample for the same year. It has been lagged so to avoid potential endogeneity 
problems in the regression model. 
Table 1 - Mean of variables by year and by country for the investor owned firms (output 
and capital in thousands Euros 2000) 
                                                 
7 http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ 
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 Country Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
         
Belgium  Output 18358 18016 18065 18653 24339 23101 26740
 Capital 5421 5873 5855 5893 6264 5962 5827
 Labor 119 122 128 132 136 137 139
 Market Share 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
 C4 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.06 0.06 0.059 0.059
Spain  Output 6416 6999 7863 8222 8821 9221 9700
 Capital 6516 7117 7991 8371 8966 9376 9858
 Labor 100 118 129 149 145 155 158
 Market Share 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
 C4 0.075 0.094 0.096 0.103 0.102 0.102 0.107
France  Output 5164 5371 5934 6427 6687 6090 6007
 Capital 5303 5510 6077 6577 6849 6250 6164
 Labor 139 139 143 150 162 160 157
 Market Share 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
 C4 0.174 0.198 0.195 0.197 0.199 0.196 0.183
Greece  Output 5963 5998 5741 5854 5923 6281 6815
 Capital 6068 6114 5857 5970 6039 6397 6931
 Labor 105 116 116 116 116 116 116
 Market Share 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 C4 0.036 0.041 0.049 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.047
Italy  Output 5251 4419 4626 4638 5013 5088 5251
 Capital 2417 2546 2716 2934 3078 3133 3293
 Labor 36 37 37 39 46 49 49
 Market Share 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
 C4 0.048 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.038
Netherlands  Output 13281 12853 13212 18314 18301 17105 15301
 Capital 13463 13041 13403 18510 18482 17273 15454
 Labor 182 189 192 197 181 168 153
 Market Share 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
 C4 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.025
Europe  Output 10143 10531 11156 11895 13376 13279 13692
 Capital 4351 4591 4935 5256 5516 5498 5672
 Labor 81 86 90 96 101 104 104
 Market Share 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021
 C4 0.071 0.0733 0.0716 0.0709 0.0717 0.0707 0.0706
                  
 
For the same reason, the second measure C4 of the degree of competition in the market 
has been derived by the concentration ratio, which is the sum of the market shares, as 
previously defined, of the four top firms at a national level.  
Table 2 - Mean of variables by year and by country for the cooperatives (output and 
capital in thousands Euros 2000) 
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 Country Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
         
Belgium Output 19786 18378 16783 15056 17408 18140 19136
 Capital 3578 3609 3364 2823 2817 3890 5827
 Labor 138 138 132 123 118 123 125
 Market Share 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
 C4 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.059
Spain Output 195 176 190 300 354 396 395
 Capital 125 138 137 115 142 255 231
 Labor 6 6 5 8 10 11 9
 Market Share 0.00003 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00006
 C4 0.075 0.094 0.096 0.103 0.102 0.102 0.107
Finland Output 223821 203517 202822 215511 225608 246800 247475
 Capital 142583 146418 141929 144287 150788 166737 203406
 Labor 2313 2302 2149 2081 2102 2235 2216
 Market Share 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.042
 C4 0.100 0.091 0.083 0.080 0.081 0.080 0.083
France Output 125902 129240 130846 136638 145610 104018 54620
 Capital 41711 44163 45107 43081 38678 18246 18175
 Labor 800 859 908 948 955 748 532
 Market Share 0.016 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.016
 C4 0.174 0.198 0.195 0.197 0.199 0.196 0.183
Italy Output 1949 1573 1621 1658 1740 1540 1498
 Capital 1439 1590 1652 1749 1752 1717 1717
 Labor 19 19 18 20 22 22 23
 Market Share 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
 C4 0.048 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.038
Netherlands Output 53706 79357 68129 87562 105169 107139 109928
 Capital 17546 19865 20288 17822 22429 40236 41761
 Labor 109 112 113 115 119 126 130
 Market Share 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010
 C4 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.025
Europe Output 9510 9266 9144 9637 10398 9319 7940
 Capital 4513 4791 4816 4818 4821 4640 5169
 Labor 75 76 74 76 78 75 69
 Market Share 0.0018 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016
 C4 0.0710 0.07331 0.07161 0.07087 0.07171 0.07068 0.0706
         
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the sample mean for the output, inputs, market shares and 
concentration ratio for investor owned firms and for cooperative firms, respectively. On 
average, cooperatives produce less than investor owned firms, use less capital and 
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 labour than investor owned firms. It is also clear from Tables 1 and 2 that the market 
share has decreased for coops and increased for investor owned firms. 
 
 
5. The results  
The maximum likelihood estimates of (12) are reported in table 3. The significance of 
the coefficients related to inputs is generally quite good and the production function is 
well-behaved. The interaction of input variable with coops is significant and negative 
for capital and significant and positive for labor: this means that, on average, coops use 
less capital and more labor than investor owned firms. This result supports the argument 
of a relative undercapitalisation of coops, not limited to the European coops (Mosheim, 
2002)8. Besides, the significance of the interaction of input variables with time supplies 
evidence of embodied technical progress. Among the other variables included in the 
specification of the production function, the dummy for the North variable is negative 
and significant. This means that there is a significant difference in technology among 
firms located in the North and in the rest of Europe. On average for the dairy industry, 
the value of input elasticities are respectively equal to: 0.20 for capital and 0.81 for 
labor in the case of cooperatives and 0.58 for capital and 0.33 for labor in the case of 
investor owned firms. Then, returns to scale tend to be constant for cooperatives and 
decreasing for investor owned firms, probably because their production scale is larger.  
Among the factors used to control for heteroscedasticity, the number of shareholders 
and the number of  subsidiaries are significant: the variance of the symmetric 
component of the error term, vit, is positively related to the above-mentioned variables. 
Among the factors used to explain inefficiency, coops are more efficient than investor 
owned firms but the difference in efficiency is quite small, as it can be seen from table 
4. The competition variable is statistically significant and positive: generally 
competition does increase inefficiency variance and then inefficiency but the interaction 
with the dummy for coops is significant and negative; this means that inefficiency for 
coops decreases as they face increasing competition. The previous result could be 
spurious in the sense that there could be a negative correlation among technical 
                                                 
8 It is usually explained by the fact that members of coops do not have an incentive to invest in capital 
equipment as they may not appropriate the increase in value following the investment, in case they decide 
to leave the cooperative. 
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 efficiency, that is output-increasing, and the decline in firm market share but it is 
supported by the significance of the concentration ratio of the top four firms, C4, and of 
its interaction with the coop dummy: generally, concentration does increase efficiency 
but it decreases  efficiency for coops. 
 
Table 3 - MLE estimates. Dependent variable LnVA 
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-ratio |P[|Z|>z] 
     
Constant 8.02 0.03 306.79 0.00
LnLAB 0.48 0.03 18.32 0.00
LnQK 0.37 0.02 18.91 0.00
LnQK2 0.12 0.01 14.67 0.00
LnLAV2 0.35 0.02 21.28 0.00
LnLAB*LnQK -0.15 0.01 -16.89 0.00
LnQK*COOP -0.13 0.02 -6.91 0.00
LnLAB*COOP 0.23 0.02 9.53 0.00
LnQK*YEAR -0.01 0.00 -2.47 0.01
LLAB*YEAR 0.02 0.01 4.46 0.00
YEAR -0.05 0.00 -9.40 0.00
NORTH -0.0007 0.00 -13.80 0.00
 Parameters in varance of v (symmetric)  
CONSTANT -2.09 0.05 -38.82 0.00
SHAREHOLD 0.10 0.02 5.69 0.00
DEP -0.07 0.08 -0.90 0.37
SUBS 0.22 0.02 13.14 0.00
Inefficiency Model Parameters: parameters in variance of u (one sided) 
CONSTANT 0.74 0.07 11.25 0.00
COOP -1.67 0.20 -8.44 0.00
THETA-1 0.0000501 0.00 49.62 0.00
THCOOP -0.0000504 0.00 -9.52 0.00
C4 -17.42 1.45 -12.05 0.00
C4COOP 18.91 4.53 4.18 0.00
     
N. observations 3534    
LogL -3359.321    
          
 
This result for coops is in line with our theoretical expectation. Moreover, the fact that 
increasing competition has a negative impact on the levels of efficiency of investor 
owned firms can be explained by the absence of an immediate incentive for workers to 
increase their effort. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that eventually investor owned 
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 firms will be able to increase efficiency once they have absorbed the shock of 
increasing competition, but only with some time lag. This can be explained by the fact 
that investor owned firms rely mostly on less motivated labor and therefore the 
adjustment to the new competitive environment takes longer than in the case of coops.  
From table 4, we can observe that technical efficiency has increased for the investor 
owned firms while the trend in efficiency level experienced by coops is less clear. 
 
Table 4 - Technical efficiency estimates 
Year Cooperatives  Investor owned firms 
1997 0.64 0.58 
1998 0.57 0.58 
1999 0.61 0.59 
2000 0.61 0.59 
2001 0.59 0.59 
2002 0.58 0.61 
2003 0.59 0.62 
mean 0.60  
st. dev. 0.19  
1° quart.  0.50  
2° quart.  0.62  
3° quart. 0.74  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have tested the hypothesis that increasing product market competition 
can help cooperatives to improve efficiency. As cooperatives are typically characterized 
by problems of hold-up and therefore appear to be inefficient, an increase in 
competition has the effect of re-aligning the workers’ interests with those of the firm 
and therefore they will increase their investment in effort. These re-adjustments have an 
impact on the firm’s technical efficiency. As workers increase their effort, the actual 
output increases and gets closer to the potential output. The result is that inefficiency for 
the firm reduces. To test this hypothesis, we have used a balanced panel of investor 
owned and cooperative firms from Europe specialized in the dairy production over the 
period 1996-2003. The empirical results show that cooperative firms experience 
positive technical efficiency change following an increase in competition. In addition, 
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 this relationship does not hold for investor owned firms where, on the contrary, 
technical efficiency may worsen. These results give support to the original hypothesis 
that increasing competition can help a cooperative to improve technical efficiency as it 
re-aligns the workers’ interests with those of the firm. 
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